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Abstract
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is considered a successful example of international gover-
nance as it has managed tensions over sovereignty claims, avoided militarisation and dealt with
marine resources and environmental protection. Recently, China’s influence and assertiveness
in many international institutions have significantly grown. What effect this shift in the
international politics will have upon Antarctic governance remains to be seen. However, to fur-
ther thinking on this issue we explore two current case studies that reveal pressure points within
the ATS. First, in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
Australia has proposed marine protected areas off East Antarctica, to which China and several
other states have objected. Second, in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings, China has
proposed special management arrangements for the area around the “Kunlun” station, to which
Australia and several other states have objected. Negotiation theory suggests “logrolling” (i.e.
trade ofmutual decision-making support across issue areas) can be an effective strategy to avoid
diplomatic deadlocks. We therefore consider the merits of a logrolling strategy for the above
issues.We find that while a logrolling strategy in the ATSmight facilitate short-term diplomatic
success, it would carry significant risks, including the weakening of existing norms.
Introduction
The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), which is composed of the four key treaties and associated
measures and institutions governing the Antarctic continent and adjacent areas of the Southern
Ocean, is a successful example of international governance. Among other things, the 1959
Antarctic Treaty settled concerns over the “problem of Antarctica”, that is, the potential for
international conflict over the seven sovereignty claims. In particular, the three overlapping
claims in West Antarctica had the potential for sparking military conflict and led to the filing
of international legal proceedings in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In addition, the
USA and the Soviet Union had histories of Antarctic exploration which gave rise to potential
territorial claims elsewhere in Antarctica, including areas claimed by other states and the
unclaimed sector of Marie Byrd Land. There was also concern about the possible militarisation
of Antarctica following the International Geophysical Year of 1957–1958. For example,
Australia was concerned that Soviet Union activities in East Antarctica presented a security
threat to the Australian continent and its southern maritime approaches. However, after
60 years of operation, the Antarctic Treaty has prevented international discord over sovereignty
and militarisation of the Antarctic. If the effectiveness of the ATS is measured against the man-
date of Article I of the Antarctic Treaty, which establishes that “Antarctica shall be used for
peaceful purposes only” and “shall not become the scene or object of international discord”,
it can largely be viewed as a governance success.
The ATS has shown significant institutional resilience in responding to new governance
challenges. Young (2010) describes the ATS as demonstrating a history and institutional
dynamic of “punctuated equilibrium”. That is, since its inception with the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty, the ATS has developed beyond managing sovereignty and security issues to include
marine resource management (through the 1972 Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Seals (CCAS) and 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources (CAMLR Convention)), environmental impact assessment, pollution control,
waste disposal, invasive species control, heritage protection and area management (through the
1991 Protocol on Environment Protection). Young (2010) points out that such institutional
development has been “punctuated” in the sense that it has periodically responded to gover-
nance challenges (e.g. an expansion in Soviet krill fishing during the 1970s) by the development
of new treaties (e.g. the CAMLR Convention) to manage these challenges, but still maintained
the Treaty’s core principles. It is important to consider ways that the ATS can continue display-
ing this punctuated equilibrium of institutional development in new contexts.
The ATS is currently experiencing a range of fresh challenges from outside the Antarctic
Treaty area that will likely call for further institutional development and governance responses.
The first of these challenges is biophysical, but heavily driven by the
social and industrial systems of the global economy. As Young
(2010) points out, some of the most pressing current Antarctic
challenges are caused by global environmental pressures, such as
anthropogenic climate change, that originate from activities largely
outside the Antarctic Treaty area, and for which the ATS has lim-
ited capacity to influence. As Stephens (2018) and McGee and
Haward (2019) argue, the ATS and associated organisations such
as Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) can act as
effective conduits for the transmission of scientific knowledge to
decision-makers within the global climate regime, but have limited
capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and prevent climate
change impacts on the Antarctic Treaty area.
The second challenge is the return of significant great power
competition to international politics. The post-cold war period
of US dominance in the international system has shifted to a more
complex situation. Importantly, the last three decades have seen a
remarkable rise in the economic and political power of China,
which many commentators of international politics are now view-
ing as a new challenge for the international system (Agnew, 2003,
2010; Kennedy, 1996; Li et al., 2009; Wasserstrom, 2013). China’s
new-found political and economic power is seen in more assertive
positions taken in international institutions, particularly on issues
central to China’s security and economic interests, such as control
of adjacent maritime approaches (“China’s assertiveness in the
South China Sea”, 2016). Antarctica is clearly not as central to
China’s national interests as, say, international trade or maritime
issues in areas such as the South China Sea. However, it has been
suggested that China views the polar regions, including the
Antarctic and the Southern Ocean, as important areas for future
resource extraction (Brady, 2017). Liu (2020a) argues that rising
Chinese economic and political power is driving a desire of
Chinese policymakers to reshape international law and institutions
to bemore aligned with Chinese interests. Liu (2020a) suggests that
Antarctic governance is likely to be affected by these developments
in international politics. However, Liu (2020b) also argues that in
pursuing its national interests, China could move beyond an
extractive resource approach to a broader vision for environmental
protection of the polar areas. If the goals of Chinese policy are
indeed still open to leadership in polar environmental protection,
the outcomes of Chinese influence on Antarctic governance might
therefore be different than first expected. It is important to keep
open the possibilities for Chinese leadership on environmental
protection in the polar regions, if they indeed exist.
However, it is important to also keep in mind that global great
power competition is not an unfamiliar background condition
for Antarctic governance. The Antarctic Treaty 1959 was formed
during a heightened period of great power competition between
the USA and the Soviet Union. The key treaties that followed
(CCAS, CAMLR Convention and the Madrid Protocol) were also
formed during this cold war period. This history of Antarctic gov-
ernance shows that significant international cooperation and insti-
tutional development are possible during such periods of great
power competition. While the recent great power competition
between the USA and China might be unfamiliar for those accus-
tomed to the relative stability of US dominance in the immediate
post-cold war, it should not necessarily signal a retreat to a more
conflictual and unproductive period in Antarctic governance.
This paper focuses upon the second of these challenges, that is,
governance of Antarctica in the context of a shifting global
international order. The paper examines a case study of two issues
causing political tension within the ATS over the past eight years
and looks at one possible strategy for resolution. The first of these
issues is the Australian-led proposal under the Commission for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
Conservation Measure 91-04 for the establishment of several
marine protected areas (MPAs) off East Antarctica.While this pro-
posal received widespread support within CCAMLR, it has been
unable to overcome objections from China, the Russian
Federation and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine and Japan. The proposal
for these MPAs remains on the CCAMLR agenda, but many com-
mentators consider that the negotiations have reached a deadlock.
The second issue is a Chinese proposal under Annex V of the 1991
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty for
the establishment of special management arrangements in the
areas around Kunlun station located on Dome A in East
Antarctica. The Chinese delegation at the yearly Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) first introduced the idea
of an Antarctic Specially Managed Area (ASMA) around
Kunlun in 2013. However, after repeatedly failing to receive sup-
port, the proposal has been re-configured as a “code of conduct”
for the area around the station. Several states have reservations
about the revised proposal as China is the only country operating
in that area. Due to the consensus decision-making practice of the
ATCM, China’s proposals for a code of conduct similarly stalled.
These two issues have been selected as a case study as they share the
common characteristics of: (i) being prominent political tension
points within current ATS negotiations; (ii) have China as a central
player potentially influenced by the wider shifts in international
politics discussed above and (iii) involve Australia as a central
player in Antarctic affairs. The following analysis is directed to
the wider group of scholars and policymakers interested in the cur-
rent dynamics of Antarctic governance and particularly Australian
and/or Chinese policymakers and stakeholders in Antarctic affairs.
In analysing this case study, the paper adopts the lens of nego-
tiation theory. Theories of negotiation (Lax & Sebenius, 1985;
Sebenius, Burns, & Mnookin, 2018; Susskind, Ali, & Hamid,
2014) and rationalist analyses of international law (Eldar, 2008)
both suggest that the parties involved in negotiation across a num-
ber of issues should consider the joint gains from cooperation that
can arise from the practice of “logrolling”, that is, the trade of
mutual decision-making support across issue areas. For example,
a party might agree to support another party in one decision-
making context, in return for similar support in another.
Through a logrolling strategy, the parties can avoid deadlock in
which both parties fail to achieve their objectives. The corollary
is that compromise and cooperation allow both parties to succeed
in meeting their aims. Sebenius (1984) explains that a logrolling
strategy employed by negotiating blocs for developed and develop-
ing countries allowed an agreement on the extensive number of
issues agreed within the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (LOSC). This was particularly evident in devel-
oped nations’ concern for freedom of naval operations and coastal
state developing country concerns over rights over coastal marine
resources. Susskind (2014) provides a prominent logrolling exam-
ple with the 1990s “debt-for-nature swaps” between developed and
developing countries. Rather than repayment of developing coun-
tries’ debt and protection of developing countries’ environments
being treated as separate issues in international negotiations, agree-
ments known as “debt-for-nature swaps” allowed developed coun-
tries to provide debt relief in return for developing countries
implementing domestic conservation programmes to improve
environmental outcomes (Susskind et al., 2014). Both countries
avoided a deadlock in negotiating each issue independently and
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thereby achieve joint gains from cooperation that might otherwise
have been unable to be achieved.
This paper seeks to further discussion of Antarctic diplomacy
by asking whether a “logrolling” strategy should be considered
as a means of resolving differences within the ATS. The issue
was raised in two pieces from Liu (2019a) and Press (2019) in rela-
tion to East Antarctic MPA and Dome A area management issues.
We examine this point further by identifying the risks and oppor-
tunities of a logrolling strategy being employed for these two issues
and proceed on the basis that any logrolling strategy would involve
Australia and China providing mutual decision-making support
across the two issue areas within the relevant forums of the ATS.
The Antarctic Treaty has been in place for nearly 60 years and
has undergone significant institutional development without overt
conflict between the parties. No differences have led to the use of
compulsory dispute resolution mechanisms or adjudication. The
dispute resolution panel established under the Madrid Protocol
has never been used, and the Antarctic Treaty and CAMLR
Convention have generated no litigated disputes. The Whaling
in the Antarctic case (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening)
before the ICJ was under the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling (IWC), so not within the ATS. The only
example of an Antarctic dispute brought to an international court
or tribunal can be found in the pre-Antarctic Treaty era, when the
UK tried to bring Argentina and Chile before the ICJ. The ATS has
been viewed by some as an exceptional success that serves as an
example for other areas of global governance (Berkman, 2010).
Questions may therefore be raised as to whether Antarctic gover-
nance might be an exception to any general tendency to consider
logrolling within international negotiations. Similarly, the shifting
international political landscapemight give a reason for caution for
implementing a logrolling strategy, as it may challenge or erode
ATS norms. Further, there may be different risks between a logroll-
ing strategy between issues solely being dealt with within ATS
forums, as compared to issues relevant to the Antarctic Treaty area
but governed by institutions and agreements outside the ATS.
This paper proceeds as follows. The section “MPAS and DOME
A” provides background on the case study material on the East
Antarctic MPA and Dome A management proposals. The section
“Logrolling in negotiation theory” raises ideas from negotiation
theory on how logrolling of these issues might allow for pragmatic
compromise for the key states involved (Australia and China). In
the section “Logrolling and compliance within the ATS”, drawing
on theories that seek to provide an explanation of state behaviour
regarding treaty obligations, we consider explanations for the
apparent high levels of adherence to the norms of the ATS and
how this might be affected by a logrolling strategy. In the section
“Lack of history of logrolling within the ATS”, we raise the lack
of history of logrolling activity within the ATS. We conclude in the
final section by noting while arguments might be made under
general theories on negotiation for logrolling across issue areas
for states to avoid diplomatic deadlock, this general statement
needs to be approached with some caution in the context of
the ATS.
MPAS and Dome A
Proposal for the establishment of MPAs in East Antarctica
In 2002, CCAMLR committed to creating a network of MPAs fol-
lowing recommendations from the United NationsWorld Summit
on Sustainable Development. Nine years later, Australia’s proposal
for a framework for the establishment of MPAs was adopted as
CCAMLR Conservation Measure 91-04 with acclamation. To
assist in creating this network of Southern Ocean MPAs, the
CAMLR Convention Area was divided into nine MPA planning
domains. These were formed for planning and reporting on the
development of MPAs and to organise future activities related
to this effort.
With the establishment of the South Orkney Islands MPA in
2009, CCAMLR made its first step towards establishing a network
of MPAs in the Convention Area. That MPA was proposed by the
United Kingdom and is just under 94,000 square kilometres in an
area within Planning Domain 1. The South Orkney MPA was
aimed at the conservation of biodiversity and improving the
coordination of scientific research activities in the CCAMLR
Subarea 48.2. Negotiations on the establishment of further
MPAs in the CCAMLR area have been more complicated. In
2016, CCAMLR adopted a second MPA in the Ross Sea area.
The Ross Sea MPA proposal was originally introduced by both
the USA and New Zealand in 2012 and it came into force on
1 December 2017. The MPA area covers 1.55 million square
kilometres within CCAMLR Planning Domain 8.
Since 2012, three other MPA proposals have been discussed
within CCAMLR, but have failed to reach consensus. A proposal
for a conservation measure establishing a representative system of
MPAs in the East Antarctica planning domain was originally sub-
mitted by Australia, France and the European Union in 2011 (the
other two proposals recommended the establishment of new
MPAs in the Weddell Sea and in the Western Antarctic
Peninsula). The proposal was for seven MPAs (Gunnerus,
Enderby, MacRobertson, Prydz, Drygalski, Wilkes, D’Urville
Sea–Mertz) each forming a representative area with specific
conservation objectives and in total covering approximately
1.9 million square kilometres of ocean. The East Antarctic MPA
proposal failed to reach a consensus at the annual CCAMLRmeet-
ing in 2012. A Special Meeting was held in Germany in mid-2013
to further discuss the MPA proposals for the Southern Ocean but
concluded with the same result. Since 2013, the East Antarctic
MPA proposal has been revised several times, introducing changes
such as in the activities allowed within the MPAs and their geo-
graphical scope. The areas under discussion during the
CCAMLR meeting in 2019 were reduced from the initial seven
to three representative areas (MacRobertson, Drygalski and
D’Urville Sea–Mertz) covering some 1 million square kilometres
of ocean. Despite all these amendments, China and Russian
Federation maintained their objections.
China has been hesitant in supporting the establishment of
MPAs in the CCAMLR area (Liu, 2019b). The adoption of the
South Orkney Islands MPA did not cause any inconvenience for
China, as it did not interfere with fishing interests (Brooks,
Crowder, Österblom, & Strong, 2020). The adoption of the Ross
Sea MPA was a difficult negotiation. China only agreed to the
adoption of the measure after a reduction of 40% of the original
geographical scope, the addition of a krill research zone and a
time-limited duration of 35 years. Nevertheless, China argues that
a separate Research andMonitoring Plan approved by CCAMLR is
required for the MPA to become fully operational (Liu, 2019b).
The Chinese delegation has claimed that to create a new MPA,
the threat of serious or irreversible damage to Antarctic marine liv-
ing resources must be previously identified by scientific evidence
and, in any event, the strong management measures that already
exist in the CCAMLR area make the establishment of new
MPAs unnecessary (CCAMLR, 2014). In China’s view, MPAs
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should not interfere with the exercise of the States’ general high
seas right to fish established under Article 87 of the LOSC within
the CCAMLR area. China’s objection to the East Antarctic MPA
proposal might therefore be linked to its interests in the expansion
of krill fishing in this region (Liu & Brooks, 2018). Other commen-
tators suggest that the Chinese desire to not limit krill fishing
potential in the East Antarctic should also be considered a part
of geopolitical power projection (Liu, 2019b). It would not be
the first time that China has taken the opportunity to position itself
in this way as a polar power (Brady, 2017).
China’s proposal for area management at Kunlun station,
Dome A
China’s interest in Dome A is not new. It is an area of some
19,000 km2 located in the hinterland of the East Antarctica
plateau and includes the highest point on the Antarctic Ice Sheet
at 4093m above sea level. Since the 13th Chinese Antarctic
Research Expedition (CHINARE) in 1996/1997, China has pro-
moted its inland ice shelf research expeditions in East Antarctica.
Departing from the coastal Zhongshan Station, Chinese researchers
arrived for the first time at the summit of Dome A during the 21st
CHINARE (2004–2005) (ATCM, 2005). During the expedition, a
series of activities such as astronomical observations and ice core
drilling was performed; however, the main purpose was to analyse
whether it would be possible to establish aChinese summer scientific
research station.
This idea for a Chinese research station did not take long to
materialise. At the ATCM XXX–CEP X in 2007, China circulated
a note to all Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP)mem-
bers stating that it would set up a new summer station at Dome A.
The proposal claimed that the Dome A Region is, among other
things, “an ideal site for supporting a series of field scientific
research work on glaciology, climatology and astronomy, and
deep-drilling of ice cores with an age exceeding one million years”.
With unique geographic and natural conditions, Dome A is a good
experimental site for science in specialist fields such as low-tem-
perature engineering materials, telecommunication technologies
and human medical sciences under extreme conditions (ATCM,
2008). After discussions at the 2008 open-ended contact group
(ICG) established under the CEP’s intersessional procedures,
construction of Kunlun station was completed in January 2009
to mark the 25th anniversary of CHINARE (ATCM, 2009). The
station has an area of 240 m² and accommodates up to 28 person-
nel. Kunlun station is located in the Australian claimed area of East
Antarctica, and Australia raised no environmental or other issues
regarding the establishment of the station. Moreover, cooperation
between the Australian Antarctic programme and CHINARE is
usual. For instance, during the 27th CHINARE, an Australian
emergency team was crucial to save the life of the doctor of the
Chinese expedition who suffered from severe symptoms of altitude
stress.
Chinese proposals for area management around Kunlun started
commenced in 2013. At the ATCM XXXVI–CEP XVI, China
introduced a proposal and the draft management plan for an
ASMA at Dome A (ATCM, 2013). The proposal claims it is essen-
tial to have advanced planning and management for the Dome A
area for better protection of its scientific and environmental values
and to assist Kunlun station to play a key role in supporting scien-
tific activities as an important international cooperation platform.
To obtain the consensus of the countries present, China needed to
convince the CEP and the ATCM that the Madrid Protocol
supported the formation of an ASMA at Kunlun station. Article
4 (1) of Annex V to the Madrid Protocol provides:
Any area, including any marine area, where activities are being conducted
or may in the future be conducted, may be designated as an Antarctic
Specially Managed Area to assist in the planning and co-ordination of
activities, avoid possible conflicts, improve co-operation between Parties
or minimise environmental impacts.
Moreover, Art 4(2) states:
Antarctic Specially Managed Areas may include: (a) areas where activities
pose risks of mutual interference or cumulative environmental impacts;
and (b) sites or monuments of recognised historic value.
During four rounds of intersessional informal discussions,
Argentina, Australia, France, Germany, New Zealand, Norway,
United Kingdom, and the USA offered suggestions and expressed
concerns. Several Consultative Parties, including Australia and
France, argued that the purpose of establishing an ASMA is to
co-ordinate activities carried out by more than one State in an area.
Even though other Parties may conduct activities in Dome A in the
future, China has been the only member State working in the area
to date.
Despite China claiming that its proposal was consistent with
Article 4 of Annex V to the Madrid Protocol, from the first round
of discussions at the CEP there was clear concern from other
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties about whether an ASMA
was appropriate for the Dome A region, given that no other state
was active in the area. During intersessional informal discussions,
eight States put forward their views, largely focusing on issues such
as the protected values, number of operators, conflict of activities,
appropriateness, alternative measures, as well as interpretation and
application of Article 4 of Annex V to the Protocol. Several
Consultative Parties were again concerned about allowing the cre-
ation of an ASMA in an area where activities are carried out by only
one Party. Brady (2017) suggested that it may also be interpreted as
granting China a certain status of “soft-sovereignty” or “soft-pres-
ence” over territory within Antarctica (Brady, 2017). This concept
of “soft sovereignty” relies on the idea that ASMAs and ASPAs can
be used by claimant States asmeans to consolidate their occupation
of Antarctica, and for potential claimant states to lay the ground-
work for future territorial claims (Brady, 2017). This is hypotheti-
cal and unlikely. It pre-supposes that accommodations of Treaty
Article IV will ultimately fail, notwithstanding that Article IV pro-
vides that nothing done during the life of the Treaty can have the
effect of establishing or enhancing a territorial claim. It is therefore
improbable that Treaty states would rely on the designation of
ASMAs and ASPAs to bolster territorial aspirations.
Despite such improbabilities, Brady argues that China consid-
ers protected areas as a form of sovereignty (2017), although few
other authors have put forward such ideas. Nevertheless, this is fer-
tile ground for speculation because Dome A is a strategically sat-
isfying and symbolic point to occupy. If it can be argued that
China’s aspirations for protected area arrangements at Kunlun
are driven by sovereign aspirations contrary to Article IV, then
it would also be open to accuse Australia of objecting to China’s
proposal solely on the grounds that Dome A is in the Australian
Antarctic Territory. The latter is highly unlikely because, if it were
true, then Australia would have objected tomultiple other develop-
ments by multiple states within the AAT over several decades. In
any event, such objections would be rendered meaningless under
the terms of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. Were Australia to
argue that objections on such grounds are valid, then Australia
would be conceding that the numerous past objections to
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Australia’s maintenance of its territorial claim are equally valid
(and, equally improbably, it would expect that other territorial
claimants would likewise accept that objections to their claims
are valid). Apart from there being no evidence of a sovereign
dimension to these disagreements over the ASMA issue, introduc-
ing sovereign aspirations or protections as factors in the current
deadlock and its resolution would be a “zero sum game” com-
pletely out of step with ATS norms. The notional sovereign dimen-
sion is therefore not further explored here.
The lack of consensus at the 2013 ATCM did not allow the
adoption of the Chinese proposal of the management of Dome
A through the establishment of an ASMA. Nevertheless, several
Consultative Parties, including Australia and France, stated that
China’s national procedures provided a strong basis for the appro-
priate management of Chinese activities and personnel at Dome A
and the content of the draft ASMA management plan would be a
relevant reference point for management measures that could be
applied through China’s national processes. The USA expressed
the view that it was not the ideal time for an ASMA designation
at Dome A and suggested national management of Dome A activ-
ities (ATCM, 2017).
After failing in four intersessional periods (2013/2014–2015/
2016) to obtain consensus on the ASMA proposal, in 2016 China
introduced to the CEP and ATCM a proposal for a “Code of
Conduct for the Exploration and Research in Dome A Area in
Antarctica” (ATCM, 2017). Unlike ASMAs and ASPAs, codes
of conduct have been developed as guidelines for conducting a
specific Antarctic activity such as the case of the
“Environmental Code for Participants in the Australian
Antarctic Program” and the “Environmental Code of Conduct
for Fieldwork in the McMurdo Dry Valleys”. However, in all
cases these have been codes of conduct for domestic administra-
tive use by the operator of the relevant Antarctic programme.
They have no mandatory application to the nationals of other
Parties (however, visiting scientists may voluntarily adopt the
practices, out of good sense or respect). It is therefore quite in
order for China to develop a code of conduct for activities of
its nationals around Kunlun station, but it should not purport
to apply it to others.
Nevertheless, the Chinese proposal for a code of conduct for
managing the Dome A area was not well received. The
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson com-
mented that Australia rejected the proposal as a code of conduct
cannot bind third States and has no formal standing within the
ATS (any more than any other code of conduct, such as for tour-
ism) (Gothe-Snape, 2019). In addition, China cannot “intend to
pose any potential restrictions for scientific activities in Dome
A” as the Treaty allows for freedom to conduct scientific research
(ATCM, 2018). The only Treaty mechanism to deal with overlap-
ping activities is through an ASPA or ASMA. As Rothwell argues,
“a code of conduct that sought to apply to anyone other than
Chinese scientists and support staff would be seen as an assertion
of sovereignty” (Gothe-Snape, 2019). Under these circumstances,
the code of conduct proposal could not obtain consensus during
the last two consultativemeetings in 2018–2019. China’s proposals
for, initially, an ASMA and then a code of conduct have so far
failed. This is because an ASMA is intended to manage activities
likely to create mutual interference (not relevant at Dome A
because there is no other operator), and because a code of conduct
cannot purport to apply to other states. Thus, like the proposals to
establish East AntarcticaMPAs, China’s proposals for the Dome A
area have stalled.
“Logrolling” in negotiation theory
Decisions within the ATS are taken by consensus. This means that
any consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty, or contracting party
to the CAMLR Convention, can “veto” any impending decision. In
the section above, we discussed how Australia and China’s respec-
tive proposals, for an MPA in East Antarctica and an ASMA/code
of conduct for the Dome A area, are currently grid-locked by lack
of consensus within CCAMLR and the ATCM. This situation
raises the question of whether consideration should be given to
either formally or informally either (i) linking the two issues in
negotiations or (ii) trading support or concessions across the issue
areas, as a means of resolving this deadlock. As discussed above,
any logrolling strategy would involve either formal or informal
linking of discussion of the two issues and agreement for providing
reciprocal support in the two decision-making forums of the ATS.
It is to this possibility that our analysis turns.
Theory has previously proved useful in unpacking problems in
Antarctic governance. Several variants of international relations
theory have been used to shed light on issues in Antarctic gover-
nance. This includes the strong use of interest-focused, rationalist,
game theoretic (van der Lugt, 1997) approaches (Joyner, 1998),
along with more pluralist regime theory approaches that also
incorporate insights from norm-focused, constructivist
approaches (Stokke & Vidas, 1996; Young, 2010) and lower scale
commons management (Buck, 1998). While these studies provide
a rich vein of analysis of Antarctic governance, it is more accessible
to those coming from an International Relations or commons
management background.
With a view to a wider audience, in the following analysis we
draw on the broad interdisciplinary field of negotiation theory.
Negotiation theory shares a similar game theoretic lineage of the
more rationalistic regime theory approaches. It seeks to use ration-
alist assumptions to provide broad principles applicable to nego-
tiations occurring at various scales and contexts of human
interaction. The “Program on Negotiation” (PON) located at
Harvard Law School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
Tufts University has been a centre of negotiation theory through
key figures such as Sebenius (Lax & Sebenius, 1985; Sebenius,
1983, 1984, 1991, 1992; Sebenius et al., 2018), Susskind (Dinnar
& Susskind, 2019; Susskind, 2014; Susskind et al., 2014) and Ury
(Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 2011; Ury, 1993, 2007). Negotiation theory
has developed strategies for unlocking negotiations through differ-
ent strategies (Raiffa, 1982; Sebenius, 1983).
For instance, Young (1989) (from outside the PON) has ana-
lysed problem-solving options for international environmental
negotiations within the model of institutional bargaining. One
of the classic strategic moves offered by negotiation theory is for
the parties to expand the range or type of issues considered in a
negotiation (Sebenius, 1983; Sebenius et al., 2018; Susskind
et al., 2014). For instance, Wallace claims that “linkage between
unrelated, or only loosely-related, issues to gain increased leverage
in negotiation is an ancient and accepted aspect of diplomacy”
(1976). Similarly, Poast comments:
Issue linkage—the simultaneous discussion of two or more issues for joint
settlement—is a bargaining tactic used by states to achieve two objectives.
First, issue linkage increases the probability of agreement. This is because
linkage can create benefits for those parties who would otherwise find an
agreement to be of little value. Second, issue linkage motivates states to
remain committed to an agreement (Poast, 2013).
By linking negotiation of two or related issues, or two regimes
established for the governance of distinct substantive areas
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(“specific issue linkage”), in theory it is possible to reach agreement
on relatively narrow questions and avoid deadlocks (Leebron,
2002). Susskind argues that issue linkage in negotiation theory is
more usefully thought of in terms of a trade that benefits both sides
and he uses “debt-for-nature swaps” as a key example of this strat-
egy (2014). By linking two different issues—environment and debt
—parallel gains could be achieved by both sides (Hansen, 1989).
Developed countries succeeded in implementing an environmental
protection agenda in developing countries by granting debt reliefs
to these countries.
Linking disparate issues in a negotiation can open the possibil-
ity for the international equivalent of a “logrolling” strategy
(Sebenius, 1983; Young, 1989). The term “logrolling” was devel-
oped in the US domestic legislative process, where political oppo-
nents agreed on providing reciprocal voting support for each
other’s legislation, for both to obtain their preferred legislative out-
comes. Logrolling therefore refers to two (or more) interest groups
trading theirmutual decision-making support across issue areas, so
both can get benefits that would otherwise not be achievable. A log-
rolling strategy is one way to reach consensus among parties with
roughly equal authority who have mutual veto power. Eldar argues
that logrolling should be considered as a type of vote-trading that
might be applied across international institutions, particularly
between trade issues and other issue areas (2008). A logrolling
strategy can involve promises of reciprocal voting support within
the same institution (i.e. “internal logrolling”), or a promise of vot-
ing support in one institution in exchange for voting support in
another institution (i.e. “external logrolling”) (Eldar, 2008).
Logrolling might therefore be best thought of as a specific type
of issue linkage in negotiations.
Determining the opportunities and limits of a logrolling strat-
egy is challenging. As an opportunity, Sebenius argues that states
might understand issues for negotiation as types of commodities
by which they (like traders in a market) can seek to optimise their
overall utility. Logrolling might therefore be viewed by states as an
efficient negotiation strategy for reaching an agreement where all
parties can move towards a position where their overall utility is
maximised (Sebenius, 1983; Tollison &Willett, 1979). If the parties
trade their decision-making support, the “zone of possible agree-
ment” between the parties is expanded and their mutual utility can
be optimised without any reduction in the utility of the other party.
However, a logrolling strategy also has some significant limits.
It increases not only the scope of the negotiations but also the com-
plexity and hence the risk of failure. As Susskind comments any
opposition to logrolling must be “on their merits” (2014). A log-
rolling strategy must be legitimised by either a functional or causal
connection between issues. With the absence of legitimacy, logroll-
ing is likely to be rejected.Whether the parties will accept logrolling
rests on the impact it has on the long-term relationship of the par-
ties (Susskind et al., 2014). Logrolling can potentially erode the
existing rules and norms of the institutions involved, or the degree
of commitment to those institutions, and the enforcement mech-
anisms to which the parties are willing to agree (Leebron, 2002). By
treating the interpretation and application of rules and norms
instrumentally, as instruments of negotiation in trading
decision-making support, the parties may undermine the regime
by changing the nature of the rules. It is necessary to consider
whether a logrolling strategy, while it might benefit national inter-
ests in the short term, may erode the collective good of existing
institutions in the long term (2008).
While Australia and China might appear to be the main protag-
onists in the East Antarctic MPA and Dome A area management
issues, it would be inaccurate to characterise the current situation
as a stalemate between only these states. It is important to keep in
mind that the consensus decision-making practice within the
ATCM and CCAMLR means that any resolution of the two issues
would require acceptance by all the ATCPs or all the members of
the CCAMLR Commission, not just Australia and China.
Consensus means the absence of formal objection. Accordingly,
to resolve these two issues will require that all members of the
Commission be supportive (or at least not object) to the declara-
tion of a new East Antarctic MPA, and all ATCPs would need to be
supportive (or at least not object) to special management arrange-
ments around Kunlun. Previous experience has shown that more
than one party can share the position of another, but remain silent
in the debate, thus “hiding” behind the proponent party and
allowing them to take the lead (and the heat) on an issue. On
the other hand, other states may remain silent as they have no
interest in the outcome, one way or the other. Thus, positions
for, against or ambivalent may not be revealed until the decision
point arrives and the existence of consensus is tested. It is also
important not to assume that the states supporting an East
Antarctic MPA are the same states that oppose special manage-
ment arrangements at Dome A.
While Australia and Chinamight consider the possibility of log-
rolling to come to some sort of mutual accommodation on these
issues, there is no certainty that other states would remove their
objections. No amount of bilateral logrolling can guarantee con-
sensus of all of the Parties whose consent is required.
Multilateral logrolling to ensure a result would be fraught with
complexities. That said, the following analysis proceeds on the
plausible assumption that as Australia and China are the key pro-
ponents for the East Antarctic MPA and Kunlun proposals, any
mutual decision-making support (i.e. promises of reciprocal vot-
ing) across these issues would carry persuasive weight in efforts
to achieve consensus within the ATCM and CCAMLR.
Logrolling and compliance within the ATS
As discussed above, the ATS is widely viewed as one of the most
successful examples of international environmental governance
(Young, 2010). Many authors point to the formation of the
Antarctic Treaty in 1959 as a point of ColdWar conflict resolution
which is the normative foundation of a different approach to man-
aging areas of the planet. The ATS has even been offered as an
exemplar of potential governance for other international problems
involving the management of competing interests and sovereignty
claims (Berkman, 2010; Scott, 2018). A part of the success of the
ATS is that (at least prima facie) there has been a high level of com-
pliance by states with the various rules and norms of the system. A
key indicator of this high level of compliance is a lack of formal
disputes between parties regarding the application and interpreta-
tion of the rules and norms of the ATS. For example, Article XI of
the Antarctic Treaty has a formal dispute resolution procedure
ending with referral to the ICJ, but this has never been used.
Similarly, Article 20 of the Madrid Protocol establishes an
Arbitral Tribunal, but this has never been convened to resolve a
dispute between the parties. A logrolling strategy commends a par-
ticular instrumental approach to the application and interpretation
of the rules and norms of the ATS. It therefore is important to con-
sider whether such an instrumental approach to the application
and interpretation of rules and norms might otherwise impact
upon levels of compliance within, and broader future of, the ATS.
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Normative-based and interest-based theories of treaty compli-
ance provide quite different approaches to this issue. Normative-
based explanations of compliance rely on states acting on a “logic
of appropriateness”, that is social standards of what it means to be a
“good citizen” within the international society of states
(Finnemore, 1996). For such constructivist understandings of
compliance, state interests are open to being at least partly defined
and/or changed by the social standards that develop between states
within international society. For example, as a part of their identity
within the international system, states directly or indirectly accept
and adhere to fundamental norms relating to sovereign independ-
ence and respect for the territorial boundaries of other states in the
system. Some normative-based explanations of compliance focus
on the procedural qualities of legal rules and institutions
(Brunnée & Toope, 2010; Franck, 1990; Tyler, 2006) and suggest
that they may produce a “legitimacy” in international law that
can “pull states towards compliance”, regardless of their immedi-
ate interests. Proving the accuracy of normative-based explana-
tions of compliance is a very difficult empirical exercise
(Brunnée & Toope, 2010; Franck, 1990), which has not yet been
attempted for the ATS or many other regimes. It would require
extensive interviewing of the subjective understandings of key
stakeholders to attempt to identify and separate the influence of
state interests, the standards of the international citizenry and
the legitimacy of the rules within the ATS. However, this line of
thought on compliance still allows a broad observation that to
the extent that logic of appropriateness operates among states
within the ATS, treatment of the rules and norms of the ATS in
an instrumental, short-term manner (i.e. through logrolling) risks
changing understandings of good citizenry among ATS states and/
or eroding the legitimacy of the rules of the ATS.
In contrast, interest-based theories of compliance are based on
rationalist calculations of state interest and more prevalent within
practitioner communities. These approaches view international
law as essentially an expression of the mutual compromise of
the national interests of the states involved in the treaty or in cus-
tomary international law (Guzman, 2008). States primarily
approach compliance with the rules and norms of international
law through a “logic of consequences”, whereby they assess and
respond to the extent to which participation in, and compliance
with, an international treaty will serve their national interests.
As Young (1989) points out, national interests of states are not nec-
essarily fixed, and may be open to some institutional bargaining
between states and other actors during treaty formation and oper-
ation. However, the important point with interest-based theories is
the primacy of a logic of consequences in assessing national inter-
ests as being a key driver to explain the behaviour of states in their
engagement with the rules and norms of international law.
An interest-based approach to understanding compliance
within the ATS leads to an interesting argument which focuses
on geography and the human condition. As Michael Byers
(2019) has argued, states have displayed significant ability to
cooperate for mutual advantage in “cold, dark and dangerous pla-
ces” (i.e. space, deep seabed and polar areas) that are largely hostile
to human habitation. This argument suggests that in these hostile
areas there is a strong incentive for all states to cooperate in avoid-
ing conflict and sharing capacities for human interaction. The cost
to states in adopting a non-conflictual and capacity sharing
approach in these “cold, dark and dangerous” places is signifi-
cantly less than in more hospitable areas of the planet, in which
the physical conditions provide opportunities for significant and
abundant resource extraction, settlement and other economic
activities. On this view, the approach of the Antarctic Treaty par-
ties to put aside differences of view over sovereignty and use the
continent as an international space for peaceful purposes and sci-
entific research is less one of farsighted internationalism and more
explainable by the expense and difficulty of engaging in human
habitation and the usual extractive resource activities. A logrolling
strategy in this context might be approached optimistically, and
with little downside, if states attempting to find mutual areas of
cooperation on Antarctic governance are driven by the physical
difficulties of human habitation in this remote and difficult area
of the planet.
The “cold, dark, and dangerous places” interest-based explan-
ation of the success of the ATS might be more persuasive in
explaining the behaviour of states at the time of the formation
of the Antarctic Treaty in the 1950s and the immediate period
thereafter. However, human capacities for safe sea and air travel
and resource extraction in Antarctica have developed rapidly since
that time. The costs and risks of individual state action in
Antarctica are also significantly less. This means that in 2020,
the remoteness and difficult conditions of operations in
Antarctica should have a lesser role in states assessing their inter-
ests in cooperating with other states in Antarctic affairs. That being
the case, it is important to consider other interest-based explana-
tions that might explain compliance in the ATS.
A more convincing and current interest-based explanation of
the success of the ATS focuses on states seeing it as being impor-
tant to promote either their short- or long term national interests
in Antarctica. If more than one State views the ATS as furthering
their national interests, then there is a zone of “mutual advan-
tage” (Keohane, 1984), where the interests of both countries
might be furthered through cooperation in entering into and
adhering to the Treaty. For example, Australia has clearly set
out maintenance of the ATS as important in furthering its
national interests in the Antarctic (Commonwealth of
Australia, 2016). Other claimant states similarly view the ATS
as the best way of protecting their interests, avoiding conflict
and facilitating science. This coalescing of interests provides an
incentive for such states to join in and comply with rules and
norms of the ATS, based upon the pursuit of their national
self-interests. A state in this situation might choose to adhere
to rules and norms which provide it with a short-run loss of util-
ity, but are more important for the sake of longer-term utility of
national interests. In this view, the success of international gov-
ernance is again purely driven by a logic of consequences of states
seeing adherence to the treaty is in their (at least) long-term
national interests.
This type of interest-based explanation of compliance with the
rules and norms of the ATS might in theory be open to a logrolling
strategy. The focus on national interests as the key driver of state
behaviour in the ATS might be amenable to states pursuing those
interests by avoiding deadlock in negotiations and trading
decision-making support between issue areas. In this way, coun-
tries such as Australia and China, as key proponents of initiatives
within different parts of the ATS, might pursue their national inter-
ests (at least in the short term) by formally linking discussion of the
issues and offering reciprocal voting support of each other’s initia-
tives to achieve short-term national goals. The “logrolling” litera-
ture referred to above largely adopts this type of short-term,
instrumental logic in assessing the possibilities for states to
cooperate in the short term to maximise their achievement
national interests through mutual support of legislative and/or
other governance initiatives.
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This approach of logrolling through a focus on short-termmax-
imisation of national interests across issue areas may overlook an
important aspect of national interests in terms of maintenance of
the institutions of Antarctic governance. As mentioned above,
Australia is one of several countries that specifically identify the
maintenance and furthering of the ATS as being a core national
interest in relation to Antarctica. While an argument might be
made that resolving impasses in consensus relating to key initia-
tives from important players in the ATS might strengthen the sys-
tem in the longer term, a logrolling strategy might carry significant
other risks to the strength of the rules of the system. If states choose
to pursue short-term national interests in resolving disputes by
treating the application and interpretation rules of institutions
instrumentally, this could have longer-term effects of weakening
the willingness of key players to adhere to rules and norms where
they are not in their immediate short-term interests.When the par-
ties negotiate their mutual support in decision-making processes,
as if they were just different types of commodities, the raison d’être
of the result of the negotiation would be just a mutual gain between
the parties and not the strengthening of the regime. A state willing
to enter into logrolling activity in the short term to maximise
national interests may effectively facilitate the erosion of the
strength of the rules and norms of an institution which is viewed
as being in their long-term national interests.
To put it plainly, even on an interest-based approach, there may
well be a trade-off between states using the rules and norms of
institutions in a short-term instrumental manner and the mainte-
nance and strength of those rules in the long term. If a country such
as Australia considered a logrolling strategy across the East
Antarctic MPA and Dome A ASMA issues, it might carry a signifi-
cant risk that other rules and norms of the ATS would be treated in
a similar instrumental manner at later times. This risk of normative
erosion of the rules of institutions from logrolling activity is spe-
cifically identified by Susskind (2014) and by Leebron (2002). The
latter argues that adding issues to negotiation may lessen fidelity to
a regime’s values and could more broadly subvert adherence to
fundamental rules and norms (Leebron, 2002).
A proponent for the use of logrolling strategies may query the
level of risk of normative erosion. As discussed above, the term
“logrolling” comes from a practice well embedded within the
US domestic legislative process, which arguably has not demon-
strated widespread normative erosion. An argument might be
made that if domestic logrolling practices between politicians at
a domestic level have not eroded the rules and norms of the system,
perhaps such concerns about adopting logrolling strategies within
the ATS are overstated. A full analysis of the general conditions
that might give rise to a risk of normative erosion in international
institutions from logrolling practices would require extensive
empirical investigation across multiple institutions and issue areas,
has not been carried out to date and is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, it is possible here to identify some important con-
textual differences between the ATS and the US domestic legisla-
tive context that might point to higher risks of normative erosion
from logrolling with the ATS and also serve as a point of departure
for future wider inquiry.
Firstly, the ATS is a successful governance system that has man-
aged spatial conflict over territorial claims by setting aside the dis-
ruptive argument over those claims in favour of advancing the
international common goods of scientific inquiry, peaceful use
and environmental protection. Strong norms and practices have
therefore developed in the ATS around the importance of
cooperation in protecting these common goods and
decision-making processes built on the consensus of the consulta-
tive party states. This situation is in contrast to the typical highly
partisan and conflictual context of the domestic legislative context
which is often dominated by political party loyalties, party ideo-
logical commitments and the interests of political financial donors
and/or lobbying industries. The instrumental use of voting support
as a commodity is arguablymore suited to, and less risky to existing
norms and rules, in an already partisan, conflictual social context,
such as domestic legislatures.
Secondly, as discussed below, the ATS has exhibited a remark-
able tendency over the last 60 years to operate in a manner that has
largely quarantined itself from wider political and ideological con-
tests within the international system. Similarly, global ideological
competition between the US and Soviet Union during the cold war
period was largely able to be kept at bay during ATS meetings of
that period. This quarantining of wider conflict has allowed for a
renewed and ongoing focus on the central rules and norms of the
system that promote the common goods of science, peace and envi-
ronmental protection. Again, this stands in contrast to the domes-
tic legislative context which is often dominated by wider political
party loyalties, ideological commitments and economic interests.
Thirdly, as a counter, we have seen how China has positioned
itself as political and economic power able to challenge the US’
position in the global order (Liu, 2020a). But Chinese compliance
with the rules and norms of international law has concerned some
in the international community (Evans, 2012). China has been pre-
pared to challenge such rules and norms when its core national
interests are at stake, such as in the South China Sea Arbitration
(Republic of Philippines v. People’s Republic of China), when
China dismissed the ex parte award given by the arbitral tribunal
constituted under Annex VII to the LOSC in 2016. Despite a desire
to be considered as a great polar power (Brady, 2017), it is unlikely
to view Antarctica as close to its core national interests as the South
China Sea. Nevertheless, the apparent willingness of China to chal-
lenge existing rules and norms of international legal order (Liu,
2019b, 2020a, 2020b) may be considered a circumstance that cre-
ates an added risk of normative erosion within the ATS. In con-
trast, the domestic legislative context typically has relatively
settled background political conditions based on political parties
with long-term acceptance of the basic rules and norms of the
domestic political-legal system.
Lack of history of logrolling within the ATS
The factors that point to a heightened risk of logrolling within the
ATS are consistent with past practices of the ATS parties to avoid
the use of logrolling strategies. There are few, if any, examples of
such strategies being used on substantive issues in the various
forums of the ATS. Even in the 1970s and 1980s developments
on marine living resources and mineral resources, there was no
attempt to make trade-offs between the two negotiations. In addi-
tion, there was no attempt to link the law of the sea negotiations
with Antarctic developments—on the contrary, Antarctica was
quarantined from the law of the sea negotiations even though
Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty specifically made allowance
for future developments relating to the high seas. Furthermore,
when the Antarctic Treaty came under sustained criticism in the
United Nations over the “Question of Antarctica”, on one view
it might have been considered an expedient time to employ a log-
rolling strategy between the two forums to make the accommoda-
tion of the different views easier to achieve. However, in our view
there is no evidence that issue linkage (or more particularly
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logrolling) was attempted. The approach of the Antarctic states
was, on their own initiative and not as part of a bargain, to respond
to the criticisms by making the ATCMs more open, making docu-
ments and reports more readily available, and encouraging partici-
pation in the Treaty by the states most critical of it. This approach
also coincided with demands from environmentalists for greater
transparency and external engagement. The Antarctic states were
primarily responding to normative pressure, from both within and
outside the system, for greater transparency and inclusiveness of
the ATS. The Treaty Parties’ approach clearly worked to satisfy
the critics and maintain the integrity of the ATS as a whole includ-
ing, most importantly, its traditional handling of sensitive issues
like sovereignty and access to resources.
In more recent practice, the absence of logrolling is in part
because the ATS forums are not held simultaneously, in fact they
are normally months apart and with discrete agendas. In addition,
different players participate in these meetings and it is often the
case that the presence of specific individuals has considerable bear-
ing on the conduct of meetings. But even where meetings are held
concurrently, such as the ATCM and the meetings of the CEP,
there is little evidence of logrolling being employed between the
various sessions, even with the same individuals present. Indeed,
even within a single forum (such as the ATCM) there is scant evi-
dence of logrolling between the issues addressed within the sub-
working groups. That is not to say there are no contentious issues,
simply that the norms and practice of the meetings avoid trade-offs
between concurrent sessions. Such forbearance is a hallmark of the
ATS, even though it results in thwarted or delayed decisions.
As mentioned above, it is also the practice to consciously quar-
antine ATS meetings from political or policy differences occurring
in other regimes. There are important examples of this, for exam-
ple, the conscious refusal of the ATCM to take into account politi-
cal differences between the states at the time of widespread
marginalisation of South Africa in other forums over apartheid
policies. Similarly, in tensions closer to the Antarctic, the
ATCM did not allow the existence of conflict over the South
Atlantic islands to interfere with important developments in
Antarctic governance. In these circumstances, where trade-offs
might have been contemplated, the parties agreed that maintaining
harmony within the ATS and strict adherence to the principles,
norms and rules of the Antarctic Treaty itself was paramount. It
is therefore argued here that the use of logrolling strategies in
the ATS would be a significant departure from established norms
and practice and could create potentially damaging precedents.
Were it to be contemplated, it would allow the possibility of issues
unrelated to Antarctic governance to be introduced, or the risk that
the enduring principles of the Treaty itself become part of a bargain
for short-term gains. This is in addition to the risk of escalation of
differences in a tit-for-tat trade. Thus, while Young correctly
observes that the ATS is one of the most successful governance
regimes, perhaps it is because it has not been reduced to “doing
deals” to make progress.
In the case studies used here, a further difficulty for logrolling is
that it appears that Australia’s objections to the Dome A manage-
ment arrangements are motivated by protecting the integrity of the
protected area provisions of the Madrid Protocol, and that its
advancement of East Antarctic MPAs is motivated by advancing
the ecosystem protection objectives of Conservation Measure
91-04 (and its objections to a Kunlun ASMA or code of conduct
are contrary to existing provisions). In other words, some might
argue that Australia is altruistically motivated by preserving the
integrity of the rules and norms of the regimes. At the same time,
somemight argue that China’s motives concerning the Kunlun are
to consolidate its occupation of Dome A––a motive that can be
characterised as a pursuit of a singular national interest to its
own advantage. If this is the case, then it is open to question
whether logrolling could be used to resolve successfully such fun-
damentally different national motives.
Conclusion
For nearly 60 years, the ATS has successfully managed geopolitical
tensions in the region, and it is considered by many to be a success-
ful example of international governance. One of the peculiarities of
the ATS has been its significant institutional resilience in identify-
ing and responding to new governance challenges. Nevertheless, in
the early 21st century, the institutional and legal framework gov-
erning Antarctica is facing a new set of external pressures, includ-
ing climate change and a shifting international political context,
that require innovative approaches to balance a variety of different
interests. This paper has attempted to contribute to the second
challenge, that is, governance of Antarctica in the context of a
return of great power competition to the International geopolitical
order.
In the past eight years, two critical issues have awakened politi-
cal tensions within the ATS, and both have Australia and China as
key participants. In CCMLR, the Australian-led proposal for the
establishment of several MPAs in East Antarctica could not reach
consensus due to the objections of principally China and Russia.
Likewise, the Chinese efforts to manage the Dome A area first
through a proposed ASMA, and later through a code of conduct,
have not received Australian support in the ATCM. In this context,
the paper examined whether a strategy of “logrolling” between
both ATS institutions could be considered as a means of resolving
this deadlock. It must be noted, however, that the delay in resolving
differences over the East Antarctic MPA and the Dome A propos-
als is short relative to the time taken to advance other issues within
the ATS. Take, for example, the more than 40 years required to
resolve the seemingly simple proposal for administrative support
for the ATCM, first proposed in 1961 and not resolved until the
Antarctic Treaty Secretariat was established in 2003. Or consider
the time taken to address the obligation to put in place rules relat-
ing to liability under the Madrid Protocol—13 years to negotiate
rules (that arguably fall well short of the agreed objective), eventu-
ally adopted by consensus in 2005, and yet to enter into force.
As discussed, negotiation theory provides some bases for con-
sidering whether “logrolling” between issues within different insti-
tutions in the ATSmight be a strategy to unlock the negotiations at
the ATCM and CCAMLR. In order to analyse the risk and oppor-
tunities of logrolling across Antarctic institutions, we have
approached an underexplored topic, that is, the reasons behind
the apparent high levels of compliance within the ATS, evidenced
by the lack of formal dispute between the parties over application
and interpretation of treaty provisions.
In considering both normative and interest-based explanations
of compliance with international rules and norms, we have uncov-
ered significant risks of logrolling activity within the ATS.
Normative-based theories are more difficult to operationalise,
but point to the risk that logrolling may shift norms of good
international citizenry within the ATS towards resolving disputes
be weakening longstanding interpretations of rules and norms.
This may cause significant long-term change to the ATS. From
the Australian viewpoint, this definitely would be undesirable.
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Interest-based theories of compliance with rules and norms
view the primacy of national interests as a key driver to explain
the behaviour of states in their efforts at problem-solving through
engagement in international law. On this explanation, the success
of the ATS resides in states understanding the regime as being
important to promote either their (short or long term) national
interests in Antarctica. A state in this situation might choose to
adhere to a treaty provision which might provide a short-run loss
of utility in return for the instrumental benefit of the long-term
utility of national interest being pursued through staying within
the Treaty system. In this view, the success of international gover-
nance is again purely driven by the logic of consequences of states
seeing adherence to the treaty is in their at least long-term national
interests. If Australia and China considered their short-term gains
by trading mutual decision-making support, they might help
achieve the adoption of the MPAs in East Antarctica and an
ASMA or a code of conduct for Dome A area. This might suggest
that a “logrolling” strategy would benefit their short-term national
interests. However, as in any negotiations, when the parties enter a
“logrolling” strategy, they should analyse the potential risk of the
negotiations and the possible national gains and losses in the short
and long term. In addition, it is also likely the case that most
Antarctic states consider it in their national interest that all other
Antarctic states are within the System and adhering to it—
international acceptance of the regime is therefore in the national
interest. The parties should therefore consider whether the gains in
the short term are worth putting an international regime, which
has always been considered as an example of good international
governance, in danger. As Australia values the ATS as important
to its long-term interests in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean,
entering into logrolling activity with China may carry significant
risk to its normative and institutional framework, especially if this
becomes a signal to a more frequent practice of instrumentalising
compliance and interpretation of the existing rules of the ATS. We
expect these findings for states will be of interest to states such as
Australia, which highly value a continuation of the ATS in its cur-
rent form. However, states which are more amenable to change
within the ATS will also hopefully find this analysis useful.
In conclusion, while arguments might be made under general
theories of negotiation for logrolling of decision-making support
across issue areas for states to avoid diplomatic deadlock, this gen-
eral statement needs to be approached with caution, particularly in
the context of the ATS. The ATS is a successful regime, with osten-
sible high rates of compliance with its rules and norms, which has
successfully managed international conflict over territorial claims
and resource extraction for over 60 years. In our view, states such as
Australia, which are highly invested inmaintaining the ATS, would
run significant risks in engaging in any form of logrolling strategy
within the ATS. Both normative and interest-based explanations
suggest that treating interpretation and application of rules and
norms in an instrumental manner, to achieve short-term diplo-
matic success, may run a significant risk of normative erosion
which could result in a weakening of the ATS. This is particularly
the case in negotiations with China, which has shown a willingness
to challenge existing understandings of the rules and norms of
international law, in areas considered important to its national
interests. To date, Australia has therefore not surprisingly adopted
a strategy of keeping the East Antarctic MPA and Dome A area
management issues formally separated, and will likely continue
to do so.
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